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Abstract
Road traic accidents are largely driven by human error; therefore, the development of connected automated vehicles (CAV) 
is expected to signiicantly reduce accident risk. However, these changes are by no means proven and linear as diferent levels 
of automation show risk-related idiosyncrasies. A lack of empirical data aggravates the transparent evaluation of risk arising 
from CAVs with higher levels of automation capability. Nevertheless, it is likely that the risks associated with CAV will 
profoundly reshape the risk proile of the global motor insurance industry. This paper conducts a deep qualitative analysis 
of the impact of progressive vehicle automation and interconnectedness on the risks covered under motor third-party and 
comprehensive insurance policies. This analysis is enhanced by an assessment of potential emerging risks such as the risk 
of cyber-attacks. We ind that, in particular, primary insurers focusing on private retail motor insurance face signiicant stra-
tegic risks to their business model. The results of this analysis are not only relevant for insurance but also from a regulatory 
perspective as we ind a symbiotic relationship between an insurance-related assessment and a comprehensive evaluation 
of CAV’s inherent societal costs.
Keywords Connected automated vehicles · Automated driving accident risk · Motor insurance
1 Introduction
Connected automated vehicles (CAV) ofer both opportuni-
ties and threats to existing business models. Car manufactur-
ers and automotive suppliers are under immediate pressure 
to innovate as the production of automobiles is their core 
business. However, direct and indirect downstream markets 
will also be afected by the ongoing automation and the 
interconnectedness of modern vehicles.
The insurance sector is acutely sensitive to the adoption 
of new technology as insurers cover risks resulting from the 
usage (motor insurance) and risks arising from the devel-
opment and production of vehicles (e.g. product recall and 
product liability insurance). In this sense, the insurance 
sector assumes risks on individual and societal levels. The 
motor insurance business is worth €137.5 BN annually in 
Europe (Insurance Europe 2019), so technological changes 
will have major ramiications to that sector. In addition, a 
failure to adequately insure existing and emerging risks may 
slow the development and roll-out of the technology and 
inhibit societal acceptance.
If CAV does reduce the number of road accidents sig-
niicantly, this would result in a material decrease in motor 
insurance premium volume. This path is by no means proven 
and straightforward but will herald profound changes and 
repercussions for the insurance sector. The combination of 
decreasing and emerging risks will reshape the volume and 
characteristics of motor insurance risk exposure. Diferent 
members of the insurance supply chain (insured, primary 
insurer and reinsurer) typically have diferent capabilities 
and appetite to take part of this risk exposure; therefore, the 
shift in the underlying risk landscape will likely also afect 
the risk allocation within the insurance supply chain.
There is an active and ongoing dialogue within academic 
literature on CAV from a technical, human-factor, ethical 
and legal perspective (Bertolini et al. 2016; Pütz et al. 2018; 
Dufy and Hopkins 2013; Lohmann 2016; Schroll 2015). In 
addition, initial accident research on the impact of advanced 
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driving assistance systems (ADAS) on the frequency of acci-
dent losses exists, but, with the exception of relevant legal 
aspects, insurance-related assessment of CAV technology 
is largely limited to practice-related discussions (Morgan 
Stanley and Boston Consulting Group 2016; Swiss Re and 
HERE 2016; Munich Re 2016; Yeomans 2014). Therefore, 
this paper combines two separated research disciplines and 
contributes to an academic discussion of CAV’s risk aspects 
focussing on the insurance sector as a key stakeholder of this 
technology. As motor insurance is a useful proxy of eco-
nomic costs arising from motor traic risk, this research also 
contributes to a risk understanding from a political and soci-
etal perspective (Claus et al. 2017). We enrich this analysis 
with an assessment of risks that are likely to emerge with 
CAV (i.e. risk of cyber-attacks (Sheehan et al. 2018)) with a 
special focus on their implication for the overall character-
istics of motor insurance risk.
Even if this development takes decades due to the slow 
penetration pattern of CAV, this paper is a timely addi-
tion particularly for the early stages of strategic planning 
approaches undertaken by insurance companies, where rel-
evant, the motor insurance market data used in this paper 
is taken from statistics available from the German Insur-
ance Association (GDV) and the German Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority (BaFin). Data on the German market 
is a good candidate to examine all (saturated) motor insur-
ance markets as the scope of the single risks covered under 
German motor insurance policies is similar to the scope of 
insurance policies in other European countries.
2  Evaluation of CAV accident risk 
and literature review
This section explores existing literature on the impact of 
CAV on accident risk starting from lower levels of auto-
mation. The fact that 90% of all road accidents today are 
attributed to human error is often used to argue that tak-
ing the human driver out of the driving task would causally 
reduce the number of road accidents. However, in a rationale 
evaluation of this igure, the high contribution of human 
error to accident occurrences is just a logical consequence 
from the fact that, for the time being, it is the human driver, 
who almost exclusively fulils the driving action without 
the intervention of active driving assistance systems. Thus, 
the igure might indicate the high potential of CAV to fur-
ther increase overall road safety but is useless as a proxy to 
quantify CAV’s potential decreasing impact on the overall 
number of accident occurrences. 769 billion kilometres were 
driven in Germany in 2016 resulting in only 5.6 accidents 
per million kilometres showing that humans are, in fact, very 
good drivers.1
A high potential of CAV to increase road safety results 
from generally favourable characteristics of robotic systems 
like the ability to permanently keep up attention (no distrac-
tion) or to react faster and with predetermined action pat-
terns. In addition, the automated system is not exposed to 
accident risk due to physical and mental human deiciencies 
like drowsiness, alcohol consumption, distractions, emo-
tional status that deteriorate the performance of the human 
driver. These factors are critical reasons2 for about 22%3 of 
all road accidents (NHTSA 2008). In contrast, it is ques-
tionable whether beneicial human cognitive abilities (e.g. 
anticipation, adaptability or empathy) can be adequately 
replicated in software-based driving systems. This is espe-
cially important as road traic is dominated by high levels of 
complexity and lexibility of driving decisions. In addition 
to risk arising from inadequate driving software algorithms, 
an automated driving vehicle will also be exposed to the risk 
of malfunction of vehicle hardware (sensors and electronic 
control units). The fact that this risk cannot be neglected 
can be indicated by increasing numbers of product recalls 
resulting from defects of these components (Murphy et al. 
2019). Hence, automated driving vehicles irst have to prove 
that they (statistically) increase road safety by reducing the 
overall number and/or severity of road accidents (“positive 
risk balance”).
Some empirical data for an indicative evaluation of 
CAVs’ impact on the overall accident risk can be derived 
from two sources. First, early indings of accident research 
for single advanced driving assistance systems (e.g. for auto-
mated emergency braking (AEB), adaptive cruise control 
(ACC), forward collision warning (FCW) or lane keeping 
assistant (LKA)) can be used to evaluate the potential safety 
impact of these systems. However, these systems focus on 
separated driving tasks and only represent low levels of driv-
ing automation (level 1 automation) and this data cannot 
be simply transposed to CAV with higher automation capa-
bility. In this paper, we will describe indings of relevant 
1 We use the number of collision-related insurance claims as a proxy 
for the total number of accidents including minor accidents. The 
number decreases to 3.36 accidents per million driven kilometres 
when selecting only police-recorded (Destatis 2017).
2 The methodology deines the critical reason as the last failure in a 
causal chain. Therefore, it may not relect the (only) cause of a crash 
and does not necessarily imply an assessment of fault. However, it 
does imply at least a contributory factor of human failure to an acci-
dent occurrence.
3 This share of failure due to physical or mental shortcomings could 
be higher because the usage of smartphones has increasingly become 
a contributory reason for distraction within the last years and addi-
tional factors such as alcohol and drug abuse have not been consid-
ered in this source.
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accident research for single ADAS systems to indicate the 
risk-lowering impact of assisted driving vehicles (level 1 
automation) only.
Second, indings from real-world testing of CAV with 
higher levels of automation can be used to indicate the cur-
rent technical reliability of these vehicles. For instance, com-
panies testing their CAV leet in California have to publish 
reports on disengagements of the tested vehicles, if they 
conduct tests on public streets. However, the transferability 
of these results is limited due to the lack of transparency of 
testing conditions and an only limited statistical representa-
tiveness of data. We will detail these shortcomings when 
describing the empirical data and research indings in later 
sections.
In the following, we describe the speciic efects of sin-
gle levels of automation that are relevant to CAV accident 
risk in terms of probability. Equally important from an 
insurance point of view will be the development of aver-
age loss costs of vehicles equipped with CAV technology. 
Even if unit costs for the development and production of 
the implemented components (e.g. radar, Lidar, GPS, cam-
eras, ultrasonic sensors, etc.) will decrease over time, these 
components will be implemented in addition to existing 
(mechanical) systems. This will promote technology-driven 
inlation of vehicle values. In addition, the implementation 
of sensors and on-board electronics, especially on surfaces 
exposed to damage in the event of an accident (e.g. bumpers 
in case of rear-end crashes), will lead to an increased extent 
and complexity of repair work that will further increase 
insured loss amounts (Liberty Mutual Insurance 2017).
2.1  CAV equipped with ADAS systems (level 1 
automation)
In vehicles driving equipped with ADAS (level 1 automa-
tion), the human driver is supported by the automated sys-
tem, which can control either the lateral (e.g. LKA) or lon-
gitudinal (e.g. AEB or ACC) steering function. Because the 
human driver still is continuously and actively engaged in all 
aspects of the dynamic driving task (motion control, tactical 
manoeuvre planning/display of action, monitoring of driving 
environment), the human driver and the assistance system 
collectively have redundancy and the risk resulting from the 
inadequate interaction of the driving automation system and 
the human driver is limited. The assistance system generally 
only intervenes in critical situations.4 In doing so, the ADAS 
system performs a non-critical driving condition through 
decent countermeasures (e.g. ACC and LKA) or by fulilling 
an automated safety manoeuvre if a time-critical interven-
tion is required (e.g. AEB). Thus, the system is designed as a 
fall-back to the human driver. By contrast, in case of an error 
of the assistance system, the human driver generally has the 
situational awareness to conduct adequate countermeasures. 
Thus, the human driver and the driving automation system 
are related by a double-sided continuous redundancy.
Indeed, analyses of the eiciency of diferent ADAS 
systems have already shown signiicant safety beneits. For 
instance, Cicchino has found that forward collision warn-
ing (FCW) enhanced with AEB systems demonstrates 
signiicant reductions of rear-end striking crashes by up 
to 50%. In contrast, the rates of receiving a rear-end strike 
were seen to grow (Cicchino 2017). A possible reason for 
this phenomenon can be that the more sudden hard braking 
actions of automated systems have not been anticipated by 
the human vehicle’s driver in the following car, thus exhib-
iting the potential conlicts arising from the interaction of 
non-automated and automated driving vehicles in the transi-
tion period of the single levels of automation. Besides the 
impact on accident frequency, the automated intervention 
of the CAV could also reduce the average severity of loss 
events within single accidents types (e.g. rear-end collisions) 
and lower the probability and severity of injuries in road 
accidents if the intervention of the AEB system proactively 
reduces impact speeds of crashes (Avery and Weekes 2019) 
(Kusano and Gabler 2012).
Jermakian (2011) investigates the potential safety beneits 
of FCW, LKA, side view assist and adaptive headlights con-
cluding that all systems combined could potentially prevent 
about one third of crashes with FCW being the most efec-
tive and potentially preventing about 20%. Similarly, Harper 
et al. (2016) ind that FCW, LKA and blind spot warning are 
relevant to 24% of overall accidents. However, they stress 
that the relevant share of accidents for the respective ADAS 
systems does not necessarily equal the share of accidents 
which are prevented. This would only be the case with full 
efectiveness and constant activation of the systems. With 
the same limitation, Kuehn et al. (2009) quantify a similar 
beneit to accident frequency of 25% for AEB and LKA sys-
tems. The discrepancy to the indings of Cicchino (2017) 
could result from technical progress between the two stud-
ies but also from the fact that the indicated safety beneits 
vary substantially by estimation methodology and by type 
of vehicle. This is demonstrated in a literature review con-
ducted by Yue et al. (2018) and also by Blower (2014), who 
found that studies indicating the crash-decreasing impact 
of the combination of FCW, braking assist and AEB vary 
between 9 and 72%. Deviations in the used dataset, research 
methodology and speciic technical design of the tested sys-
tems cause these high luctuations.
4 Relevant critical situations for example could be driving too close 
to preceding vehicle (ACC), pedestrians/stationary object standing 
on the driving lane (AEB) and unintended departure from the driving 
lane (LKA).
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In another example, reversing accidents can be reduced 
signiicantly with the development and implementation of 
reverse AEB systems resulting in a reduction of the insur-
ance claims in the near term (Grover et al. 2015; Highway 
Loss Data Institute 2017). This type of accident causes about 
40% of all motor third-party liability and fully comprehen-
sive losses (Allianz SE 2015). With passive parking assis-
tance, which only warns the driver, insurance losses have not 
decreased (David et al. 2015; Keall et al. 2017) because any 
decrease in accident frequency was ofset by an increase in 
average loss amounts.
Given the high potential of ADAS systems to increase 
road safety by active intervention in critical situations, the 
full risk-lowering impact will only materialise if the use of 
these systems does not impair human drivers’ prudence. 
Otherwise, increased risk-taking of the human driver (e.g. 
omission to look over the shoulder, lowering distance to 
foregoing vehicle, etc.) would increase the number of criti-
cal situations to be solved by the ADAS system and at least 
partially ofset the positive net impact of ADAS systems. 
This behaviour is already observed for passive safety sys-
tems such as airbags or mandatory seatbelts and led to 
signiicant rebound efects ofsetting the overall increase 
in road safety. This ofsetting efect is also especially rel-
evant for non-occupants of the respective vehicle. This is 
because of an additional risk exposure if they or their vehi-
cles are equipped with limited or only minor safety features 
(Chirinko et al. 1993). The risk that other travellers such as 
pedestrians or cyclists rely on a certain expected behaviour 
of the automated vehicle (e.g. automated emergency brak-
ing) may negate the risk of unexpected actions (Kockelman 
et al. 2016).
2.2  Partial and conditional automation (level 2 
and 3 automation)
Vehicles with level 1 automation beneit from positive attrib-
utes and abilities of both the human driver and of the driving 
automation system. However, in vehicles with higher levels 
of automation, the positive attributes of the human driver 
have to be adequately relected in the capability of the hard-
ware and software system. In addition, level 1 automation 
functions generally work separately from each other, thus 
reducing the complexity of the vehicle infrastructure and 
data fusion process. Therefore, the indings on the risk expo-
sure of vehicles equipped with ADAS only (level 1 auto-
mation) cannot be simply used as a proxy also for vehicles 
with partial and conditional automation. Indeed, redundancy 
between the human driver and the driving automation sys-
tem also applies for vehicles equipped with partial driving 
automation (level 2 automation), but the human driver now 
acts as an immediate fall-back to the system which assumes 
the primary task of vehicle motion control during automated 
use-cases. Due to the fragmentation of the dynamic driv-
ing task between the driving automation system and the 
human driver, the level of partial driving automation in 
trend introduces an additional source of risk resulting from 
the human–machine interaction as humans are generally not 
adept at keeping up an adequate level of vigilance during 
longer periods of passive monitoring.
In vehicles with partial driving automation (level 2 auto-
mation), this risk is generally limited due to the limited 
scope of automated driving manoeuvres but is ampliied 
for vehicles with conditional driving automation capability 
(level 3 automation). This is because the driver technically 
and legally even does not have to continuously monitor the 
driving scene but still has to be capable of taking control 
as a fall-back to the automated system (Merat et al. 2014). 
Here, the successive decoupling of the human driver from 
the driving task implies decreasing human driving skills and 
a decreasing ability to make decisions especially in poten-
tially risky and urgent situations, where the automated sys-
tem hands back driving responsibility to the human. The 
required duration for completion of this process depends on 
the complexity of the traic scenario set, the level of dis-
traction of the driver and the design of the takeover request 
(e.g. haptic, acoustic or visual signal). Depending on these 
variables, drivers on average need several seconds to take 
over the driving action from an automated system and even 
longer to recover full situational awareness (German Insur-
ers Accident Research 2016). This risk is ampliied by the 
fact that driver distraction (e.g. use of smartphones) is an 
increasingly important trigger of accidents (Choudhary and 
Velaga 2017; Kubitzki and Fastenmeier 2016). To limit this 
risk, the driving automation system not only has to perceive 
information from the external driving environment but also 
from inside the vehicle. The use of sensors (e.g. contact to 
steering wheel or physiological information such as heart 
rate, muscle activity, etc.) and cameras (e.g. tracking of eye 
blinking and head motion) can deduce the level of tired-
ness and distraction so that the automated system is able 
to evaluate the human driver’s capacity to take over driv-
ing responsibility (Kircher and Ahlstrom 2017; Rezaei and 
Klette 2011).
Due to these potential risk-increasing efects of taking 
the driver only partially out of the loop, it is questionable 
whether highly automated vehicles (level 3) beneit in higher 
safety and comfort and also raises diicult legal questions 
and could hamper societal acceptance of automated vehi-
cles. Recent announcements by some car manufacturers (e.g. 
Volvo (Volvo Car Group 2017) and Ford (Ross 2017)) have 
stated that they will skip the development of vehicles with 
conditional driving automation (level 3 automation) and tar-
get the design of vehicles with (at least) level 4 capability. 
For this level of automation, the risk exposure from handing 
over driving responsibility will abate, because the vehicle 
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will be capable of fulilling an adequate security manoeuvres 
allowing the human driver to take over driving responsibility 
from a safe status.
2.3  CAV with high and full automation (level 4 
and 5 automation)
Vehicles with higher levels of automation are already driven 
on urban roads but limited to testing purposes. As the tech-
nology is still immature and largely used in test mode only, 
caution is required when using current statistics to predict 
the future impact of these vehicles on the number of acci-
dent occurrences. Manufacturers testing fully automated 
vehicles in California are legally obliged to publish yearly 
disengagement reports. Disengagements are deined as “a 
deactivation of the autonomous mode when a failure of the 
autonomous technology is detected or when the safe opera-
tion of the vehicle requires that the autonomous vehicle test 
driver disengages the autonomous mode and takes immedi-
ate manual control of the vehicle” (see California Code of 
Regulations Title 13, Article 3.7, § 227.46 (a)). For this, the 
vehicle manufacturers have to report the total number of 
disengagements, the total number of miles driven of each 
test vehicle and the circumstances of the disengagements 
including the location and reason for the disengagement (e.g. 
weather or road conditions, accidents etc.) (see California 
Code of Regulations Title 13, Article 3.7, § 227.46 (b)).
As the human drivers’ accident risk can be measured by 
accident rate per driven kilometre, a statistically reliable 
equivalent indicator is missing for the comparison group. 
Even though the Waymo vehicle test leet already completed 
over four million kilometres without any accident caused 
by the (sole) fault of the automated vehicles is often used as 
an argument to underline the superior performance of auto-
mated vehicles (Teoh and Kidd 2017). Also, Blanco et al. 
(2016) in their study (commissioned by Waymo) show that 
the Waymo test leet only shows superior performance after 
(upper bound) scaling of accident rates.
That human drivers only cause about 3.3 (police-reported) 
accidents per million kilometres (see Figs. 1, 5) indicates 
that the mileage of the automated leet is not yet suicient 
to provide a statistically reliable comparison (Kalra and Pad-
dock 2016). In addition, a comparison of accident rates has 
no scientiic signiicance since information about testing 
conditions (e.g. road, traic and weather condition) is not 
transparent enough to standardise and compare with rep-
resentative traic scenarios. Also, the fact that a specially 
trained safety driver is taking over driving responsibility if 
needed makes it impossible for third parties to assess how 
many accidents the vehicle would have caused if the human 
driver had not intervened. In addition to the comparison of 
accident rates, an analysis of the disengagement reports of 
Waymo can be used to analyse the reliability of highly/fully 
automated vehicles in their current state of development. As 
disengagements describe critical situations, which do not 
necessarily lead to an accident, a comparison of this risk 
indicator with human drivers’ accident frequency rates (see 
Fig. 1) only allows for an indicative assessment.
Analysing the number of disengagements of automated 
vehicles, it can be argued that self-driving software will suc-
cessively learn from each disengagement so that a high num-
ber of disengagements at the early stages of development are 
actually desirable from a testing perspective. However, given 
the proportion of 335 disengagements of Waymo’s test leet 
per (police-recorded) accident of a human-driven vehicles, 
Fig. 1  Accident of human 
drivers versus disengagement 
rate of Waymo test leet. The 
graph shows the development of 
accident rate per million driven 
kilometres of (manually) driven 
vehicles in Germany and the 
disengagement rate per million 
driven kilometres of Waymo’s 
fully automated test leet vehi-
cles tested in California Source 
Illustration based on numbers 
provided by Destatis (2017) and 
Waymo (2017)
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the comparison indicates that these systems (at least for 
the time being) are not yet capable of adequately replac-
ing human driving capability (Favarò et al. 2017). Whilst 
the comparison is apt, the diferent driving conditions must 
be considered. For example, the snow and sleet conditions 
are more likely in Germany. However, it remains question-
able and ambiguous whether a state of superior driving by 
automated vehicles can technically be achieved. This is not 
necessarily due to the bad performance of the technical sys-
tem but due to the fact that the human driver shows very 
low failure rates measured by accidents per given mileage. 
Thus, the highly or fully automated driving vehicle irst has 
to prove that it is capable of exceeding human performance. 
The technical system is exposed to other (partially new) 
risk sources like hardware and software failures or the risk 
of malicious cyber-attacks (Koopman and Wagner 2017; 
Kockelman et al. 2016). For instance, the analysis of rel-
evant root causes for automotive product recalls also stresses 
that these risks cannot be simply neglected (Murphy et al. 
2019). Thus, signiicant sources of accident risks will still 
persist so that ex-ante claims of signiicant decreases of road 
accidents remain largely unqualiied and largely untested 
(International Transport Forum (ITF) 2018). It is not clear, 
how the frequency and even severity of accident events will 
actually develop in the future, especially given risk-relevant 
interdependencies to non-automated road users (Sivak and 
Schoettle 2015).
3  Description of the current characteristics 
of motor insurance risk
Motor insurance is worth € 26.9 BN (2017) and accounts 
for about 40% of the total premium volume (non-life) in the 
German insurance market. Measured by premium volume, 
it is the most important line of (non-life) insurance busi-
ness (GDV 2018). In the following, we will describe the 
relevance of single risks to the overall risk exposure and the 
characteristics of the single risks covered with regard to the 
frequency and severity of risk occurrences.
3.1  Composition of the overall motor insurance risk 
exposure
Motor insurance can be separated into three types of insur-
ance coverage6:
• Motor third-party liability (MTPL): Compensates for 
property and bodily injury claims of damaged third par-
ties against the owner, keeper and driver of a car and 
accounts for € 16 BN premium income (59.5%).
• Partially comprehensive insurance coverage: Compen-
sates for property losses to the insured vehicle due to ire, 
breakage of glass, animal–vehicle crash, theft, hail, storm 
and looding. It accounts for about € 1.7 BN premium 
income (6.6%).
• Fully comprehensive insurance coverage: Compensates 
for all losses covered by partially comprehensive insur-
ance and in addition for property losses due to vandal-
ism and (self-inlicted) own car damages. It accounts for 
about € 9.2 BN premium income (33.5%).
Given the scope of the diferent types of coverages, we 
separate these single insured risks into the subordinate cat-
egories of accident risk, natural perils and other perils as 
shown in Fig. 2.
Simplistically assuming that the net risk premium for the 
single covered risks corresponds with the (expected) average 
insured loss amount incurred for each risk, Fig. 3 indicates 
the relevance of each risk for the overall (net risk) premium 
income of motor insurance. It shows that accident risk is 
Accident risk
• Motor third party
liability
• Animal-vehicle
crash
• (self-inflicted) 
own car damages
Natural perils
• Hail
• Storm
• Flooding
Other perils
• Fire
• Breakage of glass
• Vandalism
• The
Fig. 2  Risks covered under motor insurance policies. The igure 
shows the risks commonly covered under motor insurance policies 
(MTPL and fully comprehensive) in Germany
38%
25%
3%
21%
3%
1%
6%
3% MTPL (property loss only)
MTPL (incl. personal injury)
Animal-vehicle crash
(self) inflicted own car
damage
NatCat
Fire
Breakage of glass
The
Fig. 3  Split of overall insured loss per single risks covered. The graph 
shows the average share of insured losses for the single risks covered 
by (MTPL and fully comprehensive) motor insurance in the German 
market between 2006 and 2015 Source Own calculation based on 
data published by German Insurance Association (GDV 2016)
6 Premium igures are based on igures for year 2017 provided by 
GDV (2018).
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the most prevalent driver of overall motor insurance net risk 
premium contributing to about 87% of all loss payments. 
Following from this, material changes to the number of road 
accidents induced by CAV would have signiicant impacts 
on the overall motor insurance premium volume.
3.2  Characteristics of motor insurance risk exposure
Overall, motor insurance risk exposure is characterised by 
a stable loss pattern. However, in a more granular assess-
ment, the single risks covered show diferent characteristics 
regarding the frequency and severity of loss events. This 
can be illustrated by the mean annual amount, the stand-
ard deviation and the variation coeicient of annual insured 
losses per type of risk as shown in Table 1.
Using the variation coeicient as the indicator of the vola-
tility of the annual loss amount of the single risks covered, 
the value of 3.4% shows that overall motor insurance risks 
exposure is characterised by quite high stability.
This is mainly due to the stability of annual loss 
amounts due to accident risk, which is characterised by 
high frequency and low severity of single loss events. 
The only exception of the only limited severity of insured 
accident losses is MTPL insurance, where losses can 
indeed be exposed to financial tail-risks. This is because 
MTPL insurance not only covers liability claims for a 
damaged third-party vehicle (property damage) but 
also further liability claims of third parties (i.e. bodily 
injury claims). This amount, especially in case of death 
or (severe) bodily injuries, can exceed property damages 
several times. Thus, MTPL coverage is exposed to finan-
cial tail-risks, due to potentially high loss amounts of 
single accidents (e.g. in case of permanent disability of 
claimants). As a result, MTPL insurance’s overall insured 
loss expenditure is indeed affected by a higher financial 
tail risk than the other insured accident risk categories as 
illustrated in Fig. 4.
However, even in case of a higher financial tail risk of 
MTPL insurance, the still relatively low variation coef-
ficient of this risk shows that the general independency of 
single insured MTPL loss events leads to a risk balancing 
effect in a homogenous and sufficiently large risk portfo-
lio. Accumulation events are largely only limited to those 
instances where the probability of losses for (a part of) 
the portfolio is increased by external effects (e.g. black 
ice on the streets).
In contrast, losses due to natural perils (NatCat risks) 
are characterised by low frequency but potentially high 
severity of loss events leading to a high variation coeffi-
cient of the annual insured loss amounts of 49.5% (storm 
and hail) and 46.7% (flooding). The high severity results 
from the correlation of single insured objects affected 
in one loss event. Even if the loss amount to a single 
insured vehicle is regularly limited to (a fraction of) its 
property value, natural perils typically affect multiple 
insured objects in their sphere of activity. Hence, natural 
perils regularly lead to events with high accumulated loss 
amounts. Because of this, it is more difficult to balance 
NatCat risk throughout a year, especially within a region-
ally limited risk portfolio. Therefore, NatCat risks have to 
be balanced within the own portfolio through time or by a 
(partial) risk-transfer to an external party (e.g. reinsurer).
4  Potential impacts on accident risk 
characteristics
The low volatility of annual insured losses is mainly due 
to the fact that accident risk is only exposed to a limited 
risk exposure from accumulation or series loss events. 
However, with CAV on the roads, this could change due 
to series loss events arising from the correlation of soft-
ware-based driving decisions and due to accumulation loss 
events arising from cyber-attacks.
4.1  Correlation of accident risk losses of CAV
When a leet of CAV (e.g. from the same manufacturer) 
is fulilling the automated driving task based on the same 
deterministic algorithm, the driving behaviour of these 
vehicles is directly correlated with each other. This means 
that CAVs are programmed in the way that every vehicle 
will decide uniformly on how to fulil a driving action 
within a given scenario set.
Driving algorithms that can unilaterally adopt them-
selves to input from the dynamic environment could 
potentially introduce severe legal risks for vehicle manu-
facturers, as the obligation to monitor (unknown risks of) 
the products after bringing the vehicles into the market 
could be inadequate, complex and costly. This is because 
the duty to monitor should increase, as the potential risk 
resulting from the system carrying out safety-crucial 
driving actions autonomously will increase. Therefore, a 
centralised adjustment of the algorithms by the vehicle 
manufacturer based on the input data of the CAV leet is a 
realistic solution and fulils legal requirements to ensure 
adequate safety monitoring processes.
With this assumption, series accident losses become man-
ifest, if single vehicles of the afected leet face the same risk 
scenario set. The extent of series loss exposure depends on 
the period of time the car manufacturer needs to discover 
and ix algorithmic errors by applying patches via (over-the-
air) software updates.
In addition, the risk of accumulated accident loss events 
could arise from several vehicles jointly travelling in 
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platoons, where accident risks might turn from crashes of 
single or two vehicles to more severe multi-vehicle crashes. 
This is because a cohort of vehicles is driving close to each 
other, at high speed and dependent on information received 
by the foregoing vehicle increases correlation risk.
4.2  Cyber risk
The automation of the vehicles’ driving action techni-
cally does not need to be accompanied by an (over-the-air) 
communication interface (local navigation through on-
board sensors), but the interconnection enables parts of the 
expected beneits of comfort and safety features brought by 
automated vehicles (global navigation of the vehicle leet). 
In this way, the automation and interconnection of CAV are 
complementary and interrelated technologies.
Cyber-attacks against road vehicles are not yet common, 
but modern vehicles already possess several communica-
tion interfaces that can be used as access points for cyber-
attackers. In general, these communication interfaces can 
Table 1  Mean value, standard 
deviation and variation 
coeicient of total insured 
losses of single risks
The table shows the mean value, standard deviation and variation coeicient of annual insured losses per 
type of risk covered under (MTPL and comprehensive) motor insurance in the German market between 
2006 and 2015. Source: Own calculation based on data published by German Insurance Association (GDV 
2016)
Type of risk covered Mean (in € 1000) Standard deviation (in 
€ 1000)
Variation 
coeicient 
(%)
Accident risk
 MTPL (property loss only) 6,903,143 289,054 4.19
 MTPL (incl. personal injury) 4,536,305 333,397 7.35
 Animal–vehicle crash 517,761 46,993 9.08
 (Self-inlicted) own car damage 3,792,456 220,320 5.81
Nat cat
 Storm, hail 618,243 306,011 49.50
 Flooding 12,061 5638 46.74
Other risks
 Fire 104,922 18,165 17.31
 Breakage of glass 1,147,331 89,794 7.83
 Theft 498,454 52,518 10.54
 Other 10,585 1930 18.23
Total
 Overall motor insurance risk 18,143,273 611,942 3.37
Fig. 4  Distribution of total 
insured losses per insured loss 
amount. The graph shows the 
distribution of overall loss 
expenditure per insured loss 
amount for MTPL, partially 
comprehensive and fully com-
prehensive motor insurance in 
the German market for the year 
2015 Source calculations based 
on data published by German 
Insurance Association (GDV 
2016)
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be separated into (indirect) physical access and short-range 
or long-range wireless access channels (Checkoway et al. 
2011). Short- and long-range wireless connections (e.g. 
Bluetooth, WiFi, broadcast connection) open access points 
for (external) remote cyber-attackers.
If it is possible for cyber-attackers to hack not only one, 
but a leet of CAV or traic infrastructure, losses to sin-
gle vehicles would be directly correlated and exposed to 
accumulation risk. Depending on the probability of cyber-
attacks and the inancial losses due to each afected CAV, the 
loss pattern of the inherent risk could be both volatile and 
high in severity. As a result, cyber-attacks on a leet of CAV 
could induce a second source of accumulation loss events 
(in addition to NatCat risk) and shift the characteristics of 
overall accident risk to higher volatility and severity of loss 
occurrences. In addition, cyber-attacks to digital infrastruc-
ture show the phenomenon that they are not only limited 
to one speciic line of business (e.g. motor insurance) but 
could also afect several lines of the insurance business (e.g. 
business interruption). This characteristic even presents spe-
cial challenges to enterprise risk-management of a vehicle 
manufacturers but also accumulation risk control of insur-
ance entities. Due to the NatCat-like characteristics of cyber-
risks, again the need for risk-transfer of motor insurers (e.g. 
via reinsurance coverage) is relevance and not limited to 
smaller and mid-size motor insurers with a regional focused 
portfolio but also insurance companies with a portfolio that 
is regionally diversiied. This is because of the described 
phenomenon of cyber-risks that are neither limited to single 
regions nor to single lines of insurance business.
5  Efects from a shift to service-based 
mobility solutions
The increasing penetration of CAV technology is gener-
ally expected to accelerate a change in societal mobility 
approach shifting away from the ownership of vehicles to the 
use of shared on-demand mobility services (Krueger et al. 
2016). This shift would strongly afect customer interfaces 
because a (commercial) entity providing the mobility ser-
vice assumes the role of the vehicle owner and is obliged to 
maintain adequate insurance coverage. This produces a shift 
in customer interfaces from a business-to-customer (b2c) 
relationship between the insurer and the individual vehicle 
owner to a business-to-business (b2b) relationship between 
the insurer and the (commercial) mobility service provider.
The progressive usage of shared-mobility services could 
also facilitate the penetration of CAV technology into the 
overall vehicle leet because of a potential decline of the 
required leet size (Morency et al. 2015) and because the 
relatively high acquisition costs of CAV7 could be balanced 
by more eicient use of the vehicles. In turn, this would 
shorten the traditionally slow-moving penetration patterns8 
of driving assistance systems and would catalyse the impacts 
of CAV technology on the overall road safety and insurance-
speciic risk exposure.
7 It is assumed that vehicles equipped with CAV technology espe-
cially in the beginning of market penetration will be relatively expen-
sive due to required hardware (e.g. cameras and sensors) and software 
components.
8 For instance, the anti-lock braking system (ABS) and electronic 
stability control (ESC) took about 20 and 15 years until more than 
80% of all newly registered vehicles were equipped based on igures 
of the Deutsche Automobil Treuhand GmbH (DAT 2018). DAT 2018. 
DAT Report 2018.
Fig. 5  Mileage-adjusted number 
of police-recorded accidents. 
The graph shows the develop-
ment of the overall number of 
police-recorded accidents events 
per million driven kilometres 
in Germany between 1991 and 
2016 Source Own illustration 
based on numbers provided by 
Destatis (2017), Radke (2014) 
and Bundesanstalt für Straßen-
wesen (2017)
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In a potentially shrinking vehicle fleet, the extent of 
(insured) loss events due to natural perils such as storm, 
hail or looding events declines in line with the reduction 
in the number of vehicles afected in the spatial sphere of 
activity of the respective natural peril. This potentially risk-
lowering impact is especially relevant as the adoption of 
shared-mobility higher in urban areas where the concentra-
tion of exposed vehicles in a relatively small area is espe-
cially high. Resulting from this, the absolute risk exposure 
resulting from NatCat events would decrease due to the 
indirect efects of CAV on societal mobility patterns, which 
would (partially) counterbalance or even overcompensate 
expected increases of average loss amounts to single afected 
vehicles due to technical inlation.
By contrast, the impact of the shift to a service-based 
mobility approach to the overall accident risk exposure 
strongly depends on the future amount of overall driven 
vehicle kilometres (Ahangari et al. 2017). This is because of 
the strong correlation between the total mileage driven and 
the overall number of road accidents which can be indicated 
by a Pearson correlation coeicient r = 94%. The follow-
ing graph shows that the number of accidents per mileage 
remains stable and on already very low levels with currently 
the human driver taking over driving responsibility.
Indeed, there are diferent reasons why the wider adop-
tion of shared service-based mobility solutions could lead to 
an increase in the overall vehicle mileage and thus increase 
risk exposure (Wadud et al. 2016; Litman 2018). First, an 
increase in mobility participation for impaired or elderly 
people could stimulate additional mobility demand by 
these user groups. Assuming, that these groups today have 
to use public transport services, higher individualisation of 
mobility solutions for this cohort could increase the total 
mileage driven. In addition, increasing use of individual 
mobility services instead of centralised public mass trans-
port could also be applicable for broader user groups that 
today satisfy their individual mobility demand with public 
transport services (e.g. commuters) if shared-mobility solu-
tions reduce mobility costs. Second, assuming that the trip 
planning of two independent individuals is unafected by a 
shift in societal mobility approach, the total mileage driven 
increases because of empty journeys of the shared automated 
vehicle between two successive users. Depending on dif-
ferent assumptions and scenarios, for instance (Trommer 
et al. 2016) expects increases in total mileage between 2.5 
and 8.5% by 2035. This would mean that increased mileage 
would likely ofset parts of potential safety gains in absolute 
terms, even if automated vehicles would turn out to be safer 
per mile than the average human driver today (Groves and 
Kalra 2017).
6  Conclusion
A lack of empirical data and suitable proxies to assess the 
CAV impact on accident risk makes decisions by policymak-
ers, society and businesses very diicult. As a result, public 
and political debates of CAV’s future implications on society 
and risk tend to be based on simpliied and biased assump-
tions, which are (not yet) based on scientiic evidence. From 
an insurance point of view, this presents a fundamental chal-
lenge, as the business model of motor insurance is directly 
dependent on accident risk.
Given these challenges, we have described current motor 
insurance risk exposure and risk characteristics and have 
used indings from accident research as well as available 
data on Waymo’s CAV leet to qualitatively assess the (insur-
ance-relevant) risk implications of this technology. In doing 
so, our research shows important indings for insurers and 
regulators.
Empirical data indicates that vehicles equipped with 
ADAS systems of level 1 automation indeed contribute to 
road safety. However, from an insurance perspective, the 
decreasing impact on accident frequency will likely be (par-
tially) balanced as the average loss amounts will increase 
due to technologically driven inlation and the higher com-
plexity of repair work as well as risk compensation resulting 
from more intensive driving. We describe why those indings 
for lower levels of automation cannot just be applied analo-
gously to vehicles with higher levels of automation capabil-
ity and we use a comparison of disengagements (automated 
Waymo vehicle leet) and accidents (human-driven leet) per 
million driven kilometres to illustrate that (at least the cur-
rent) performance of automated driving vehicles does not 
seem to be superior to human drivers.
From a regulatory point of view, this comparison is not 
able to precisely quantify the future risk exposure of vehicles 
with high and full automation but indicates that the promise 
of accident-free traic is based on fragile grounds. We pro-
pose that CAV vehicles should be subject to close monitor-
ing of their actual risk impacts. This monitoring should be 
conducted by independent and interdisciplinary institutions. 
Here, the insurance industry is one of the key stakeholders 
and bridging the gap between accident research and insur-
ance industry knowledge can ground considerations of the 
inherent societal costs of CAV technology (Casualty Actu-
arial Society 2018; Finkel and Gray 2018). Stating this, the 
current approach of disengagement reporting does not allow 
for a transparent assessment of possible risk implications 
and opens the risk that regulatory and economic decisions 
to introduce CAV technology are based on illusive assump-
tions. This could turn out to be negligent if potential faulty 
assumptions lead to a reallocation of investment budgets for 
conventional road traic safety strategies also taking into 
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account vulnerable manual road users (e.g. pedestrians, 
bicyclists, motorcyclists, etc.) in more realistic scenario 
which is highly exposed to mixed-traic scenes.
Due to the surrounding uncertainty related to CAV insur-
ance risk analysis, further actuarial analysis and research are 
needed to prepare the insurance sector for a possibly chang-
ing risk landscape in the future. To proactively prepare for 
these changes, a more short-term measure of motor insur-
ance companies is to explore accident data sets of diferent 
ADAS systems (level 1 and level 2 automation) already cov-
ered insured leets. That said, a major challenge for this is the 
granularity of data gathered for traditional motor insurance 
pricing, which does not always allow identiication of the 
technology’s presence in vehicles (Casualty Actuarial Soci-
ety 2018). With a long-term focus on vehicles with higher 
levels of automation, the adjustment of pricing models that 
currently focus on proxies to account for human driver’s 
individual risk has to be replaced with a pricing model to 
relect the reliability of the automated driving system. As 
transparent and longstanding loss data for this is missing, 
insurers have to build up interdisciplinary know-how to 
expand today’s actuarial driven pricing knowledge with deep 
technical know-how about CAV hard- and software vulner-
ability. Furthermore, as driving capabilities of CAV could 
luctuate with newly introduced software updates, pricing 
data could be exposed to higher variability.
With describing risk-relevant aspects, this paper provides 
a qualitative but more granular assessment of CAV’s poten-
tial risk impact than existing quantitative forecasts of CAV’s 
impact on the motor insurance premium. The results of the 
existing forecasts highly difer from each other contingent 
on the publisher (i.e. consulting irms or German Insurance 
Association), indicating that a lack of empirical data leaves 
space for a highly biased debate on the issue. This paper 
provides additional value to the insurance-related discussion 
by broadening the scope from a focus on absolute premium 
volume to crucial strategic questions such as the character-
istics of risk exposure and customer interfaces. Here, our 
analysis shows that CAV will have a signiicant impact on 
the inherent risk characteristics of the motor insurance busi-
ness. Beyond that, a shift in societal mobility approach with 
a changing customer interface will also have a strong impact 
on the risk exposure of the motor insurance market.
Referring to the possible changes of motor insurance risk 
characteristics, we emphasise the current smoothing impact 
of accident risk to the overall volatility of annual motor loss 
insurance loss expenses. The relevance of this risk could 
decrease with CAVs on the road, but this is still uncertain 
and accompanied by signiicant adverse side efects. In 
addition, the volatility could further increase due to pos-
sible correlated accident events and the emerging risk of 
cyber-attacks as well as accumulation loss events resulting 
from platooning. A declining relevance of regular accident 
occurrences would just enhance this volatility-increasing 
efect. This means the required risk-capital for a given vol-
ume of written motor insurance premium will also increase.
The increasing volatility of losses and the potential cor-
relation of emerging (automotive) cyber-risks with other 
insurance lines of business present challenges for the man-
agement of loss accumulation risk of insurance companies. 
It is important that the changing loss pattern of the future 
motor insurance business adequately matches the risk-appe-
tite and capacity of the risk-taking insurance company. For 
(smaller) insurance groups with a focus on retail property 
and casualty insurance risks and limited risk-taking capac-
ity, risk-transfer to reinsurers will likely be more relevant 
to smooth the unbalancing impact on the net risk portfolio.
Given the already competitive environment of the motor 
insurance market in saturated markets together with the low 
proitability9 and the expected increasing volatility of losses, 
we expect the return on risk adjusted capital (RORAC) to 
decline and lead to a higher consolidation within the motor 
insurance market. This is even fostered by the described 
potential shifts in societal mobility leading to changing cus-
tomer interfaces towards commercial customers. As a result, 
we ind that primary insurers focusing on private retail motor 
insurance face strategic risks to their business model. How-
ever, the development and penetration of market-ready CAV 
especially of these with higher levels of automation required 
for fully service-based mobility approaches (level 4 and 5 
automation) take several years or even decades so that the 
signiicant changes described in this analysis will proceed 
on an evolutionary rather than a disruptive basis.
Funding This work was supported by the VI-DAS (Vision Inspired 
Driver Assistance Systems), a European Commission Horizon 2020 
research consortium [Grant Number 690772].
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